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Abstract
Interbank lending and borrowing occur when financial institutions seek to settle and refi-
nance their mutual positions over time and circumstances. This interactive process involves
money creation at the aggregate level. Coordination mismatch on interbank credit may trig-
ger systemic crises. This happened when, since summer 2007, interbank credit coordination
did not longer work smoothly across financial institutions, eventually requiring exceptional
monetary policies by central banks, and guarantee and bailout interventions by governments.
Our article develops an interacting heterogeneous agent-based model of interbank credit co-
ordination under minimal institutions. First, we explore the link between interbank credit
coordination and the money generation process. Contrary to received wisdom, interbank
credit has the capacity to remove the inner limits of monetary system capacitance. Second,
we develop simulation analysis on imperfect interbank credit coordination, studying impact
of interbank dynamics on financial stability and resilience at individual and aggregate levels.
Systemically destabilizing forces prove to be related to the working of the banking system
over time, especially interbank coordination conditions and circumstances.
Highlights
• An interacting heterogeneous agent-based model under minimal institutions is devel-
oped to study bank credit, money creation and interbank credit
• Interbank credit makes the money generation process unbound in some circumstances
• Financial stability depends on both bank and inter-bank credit conditions and circum-
stances
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1 Introduction
During recent decades before the global financial crisis, mainstream economic theory had quite
neglected the role of money and credit in economy and society (Jakab and Kumhof, 2015;
Werner, 2014a,b). In particular, macroeconomic theory was drawing upon the real business
cycle approach, developing Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models where
money and credit did not play a significant role (Blanchard, 2009; Stiglitz and Gallegati, 2011;
Romer, 2016; Delli Gatti et al., 2010; Blanchard et al., 2010). In this context, banking was
understood as a mechanic process that merely dispatches central bank base money to non-
financial, real-economic agents who need borrowing. Moreover, banking theory was developing
principal-agent approaches that introduced contractual arrangements and incentives in the bank
entity structure while relegating bank money generation function outside banking theoretical
core (Calorimis and Kahn, 1991; Diamond and Rajan, 2001; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Gorton
and Pennacchi, 1990). At the same time, financial economics was developing a market-based
finance theory where banks were considered as portfolio managers quite analoguous to other
investment funds and submitted to financial markets discipline (Tobin, 1963; Black, 1970; Fama,
1980; Hall, 1983). From these perspectives, banking come to be understood as pure intermedia-
tion of available funds between savers who wish to invest those funds, and borrowers who need
borrowing them.
Evidence from the global financial crisis of 2007-08 has been renewing theoretical interest in
the role of banking, money and credit in economic and financial dynamics. While the crisis
was accidentally triggered by rising actual and expected defaults in some bank asset categories,
the origins of the global financial meltdown were found in systemic fragilities related to bank
excess behaviours and the overarching dynamics of interbank credit, leading to central bank in-
terventions and government bailouts to protect financial stability and assure financial resilience
(BoE, 2008). Interbank lending and borrowing occur when financial institutions seek to set-
tle and refinance their mutual positions over time and circumstances. This interactive process
involves money generation at the aggregate level. Coordination mismatch on interbank credit
may trigger systemic crises. This happened when, since summer 2007, interbank credit coordi-
nation did not longer work smoothly across financial institutions around the world, eventually
requiring exceptional monetary policies through central bank coordination (Ricks, 2016; Blair,
2013; Gorton, 2010; Singh, 2014).
2
Recent studies have been investigating the role of money, credit and interbank credit networks
in the working of the financial system, including when financial crises occur. Martnez-Jaramillo
et al. (2010) and Caccioli et al. (2015) develop simulation models that relate interbank dy-
namics with systemic risk. Matsuoka (2012) provides a monetary model for understanding the
role of lender of last resort (i.e.: central banks) in an economy with an imperfect interbank
market. Anand et al. (2012) address the heavy reliance on short-term wholesale funding mar-
kets in a vastly and increasingly connected financial system during the global financial crisis of
2007/2008, leading to a dramatic increase in rollover risk at the system level. Further studies
focus on the interbank credit network structure and the financial linkages between banks, of-
ten applying agent-based simulations (Krause and Giansante, 2012; Teteryatnikova, 2014; Bech
et al., 2015; Capponi and Chen, 2015).
Many studies apply agent-based modelling (ABM) to analyze the interbank credit dynam-
ics. Huang et al. (2010) apply an ABM to examine various types of financial crises. Galbiati
and Soramaoki (2011) propose an ABM of interbank payment systems under real-time gross
settlement modality that seems to be vulnerable to liquidity risk. To their knowledge, it is the
first paper to explore liquidity management in such a system using an agent-based approach.
Other ABM are applied to explain: the formation, evolution and stability of interbank market
(Iori et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2016; Ladley, 2013); the emergence of network structure (e.g.: core-
periphery) (Lux, 2015); the linkage between the interbank market and the real economy (Gabbi
et al., 2015); the repercussions of inter-bank connectivity on bank performances, bankruptcy
waves and business cycle fluctuations (Grilli et al., 2015); the role of trading memory or trust in
the interbank relationships (Iori et al., 2015; Temizsoy et al., 2015; Bulbul, 2013); the behavior
of bank leverage (Fischer and Riedler, 2014; Aymanns and Farmer, 2015); the role of stabilizing
institutional arrangements based on socioeconomic roles and leaderships (Gilles et al., 2015);
the bank default and resolution (Klimek et al., 2015). More generally, Bargigli and Tedeschi
(2014) review some basic concepts and instruments in a wide range of economic network models.
Pointing to the link between the banking system and real economy, Delli Gatti et al. (2010)
model a macroeconomic credit network consisting of households, firms and banks, in view to
study the occurrence and likelihood of bankruptcy avalanches. Battiston et al. (2012), Riccetti
et al. (2013), Bargigli et al. (2014), and Catullo et al. (2015) extend this work. Lux (2016) and
Anand et al. (2013) develop stochastic models of the topology of bank-firm credit networks.
He et al. (2016) design an endogenous credit network model that describes the formation of
firm-firm, firm-bank and bank-bank credit relationships. Moreover, Delli Gatti and Desiderio
(2015) and Beck et al. (2014) apply ABM to explore the effects of monetary policy. Their
simulations show its clear non-neutrality and transmission mechanism in the credit channel.
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Valencia (2014) discusses a similar issue. Gabbi et al. (2015) focus on the linkage between the
inter- bank market and the real economy with a stylized central bank acting as a lender of
last resort. Our article contributes and expands on these analyses by paying specific attention
to the way banks perform credit creation along with inter-bank credit, clearing, and payment
settlement.
Concerning modeling the money generation process, Xiong et al. (2017) develop a multi-agent
model describing the main mechanisms of money creation and money circulation in a credit
economy. Similarly, Chen et al. (2014) examine the money generation process in a random
exchange model with debt between agents. Our article expands on these analyses by combining
payment and credit systems, while introducing endogenous money generation through bank
credit and interbank credit.
Our article contributes to recent literature by taking a systemic perspective, aiming to overcome
received limited understanding of the systemic links between money, credit and banking. Some
facts feature modern banking: monetary financial institutions (banks) issue claims which func-
tion as money; they facilitate payments across agents in the economy over time and space; they
increase the money base through credit creation; they hold fractional reserves and lend to each
other (Blair, 2013; Ricks, 2016; Jakab and Kumhof, 2015). Our systemic perspective points to
these featuring dimensions of ongoing bank activity within each bank entity and across them.
Each bank entity keeps currency money in bank deposits on behalf of other agents. But the
bank entity activity is further characterized by its capacity or privilege to use these deposits,
although the latter remain available for payment and redemption at will and at par. More-
over, the bank can create a deposit by granting a loan to, or buy a security from a borrower.
This bank capacity or privilege involves money multiplication that enables bank credit creation
process over space and time. In this way, all the banks become interdependent on the flow of
payments that are performed across them, generating a ‘banking system’ (Biondi, 2018).
This banking dynamic system requires coordination within each bank and across them. Within
each bank entity, two featuring processes are at work: (i) An economic process that creates bank
money through credit, in view to generate income to the bank entity; and (ii) a financial process
that rebalances cash inflows and outflows when they become due through space and time. Since
each bank is structurally unbalanced due to money multiplication, interbank coordination is
required to maintain the banking system in operation over time and circumstances. Interbank
clearing, settlement and credit arrangements feature this interbank coordination which occur
under various institutional arrangements, such as central banking, central clearing parties, and
money markets. Interbank coordination management is concerned with counterparty risk, fund-
ing risk, settlement risk, margin risk, liquidity risk and payment risk, that is, risks, uncertainties
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and hazards related to interactions and relationships across banks. From this perspective, our
conceptual framework embeds heterogeneous agents into two collective dynamics: inter-agent
interaction, and interaction between collective structures and individual agents. These struc-
tures are consistent with the notion of ‘minimal institution’ introduced by Shubik (2011) and
Shubik and Smith (2016).
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Drawing upon this conceptual frame of reference,
we develop an interacting heterogeneous agent-based model of interbank credit coordination
under a set of minimal institutions (Section 2). First, we explore the theoretical link between
interbank credit coordination and the money generation process (Section 3). Second, we develop
simulation comparative analysis on modes of interbank credit coordination, studying impact of
interbank dynamics on financial stability and resilience at individual and aggregate levels (Sec-
tion 4). Systemically destabilising forces prove to be related to the working of the banking
system over time, especially interbank coordination conditions and circumstances. A summary
of main findings and implications concludes (Section 5).
2 Agent-based dynamic modelling of the banking system
According to Xiong et al. (2017), the textbook story of money creation tells that the quantity
of loans that commercial banks may possibly grant is constrained by the quantity of central
bank base money (central bank reserves, comprising currency and drawing facilities) and the
required reserve ratio. This story is consistent with fractional reserve lending of loanable funds,
where, period through period, each lending bank department is restricted to lend out only a
fraction of available cash in hand. Under fractional reserve requirement, money is therefore
created through a gradual, ad infinitum mechanical process of ‘lending out’ and ‘depositing in’
of cash in hand (narrow banking). This modelling strategy has been often criticised to neglect
space and time of money generation process, implying a reductionist view on its idiosyncratic,
interactive, collective and dynamic dimensions. In particular, this view makes banking system
coordination virtually irrelevant.
Our model extends and upgrades on this received understanding by drawing upon the func-
tional equivalence between currency and deposit. From this functional perspective, money can
be created both by issuing cash and cash-equivalent securities (that is, financial entitlements
that circulate and function like cash does), and by creating drawing facilities (bank deposits)
that promise to be redeemable in cash and cash-equivalents. In this context, banking, money
and credit are fundamentally linked one to another. When a bank lends to a borrowing client,
bank balance sheet simultaneously expands with the loan (an asset to the bank) and the deposit
(a liability to the bank), both relating to that customer, while the bank promises to make the
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customer deposit redeemable in cash and cash equivalents (especially other banks’ deposits).
When the borrowing client repays its loan to the bank, the loan capital instalment reduces
the customer’s exposure (an asset reduction to the bank), while the bank does either acquire a
different kind of asset (if settlement is performed by cash transfer), or reduce its deposit liability
(if settlement is performed through customer’s deposit).
Our story replaces fractional reserve lending with a money multiplication process. The bank
treasury department seeks to rebalance movements in cash and cash equivalents that become
due for settlement-related and credit-related payments, while the bank lending department
levers upon cash and cash-equivalent holdings to create new loans. To disentangle the systemic
connection between payments, bank credit and inter-bank credit, we develop an agent-based
model comprising three functional steps that each bank passes through when managing its re-
lation with customers and with the other banks. These dynamic steps correspond to ongoing
dimensions of the banking system: (i) payments system (Section 2.2), (ii) bank credit creation
and destruction with customers (Section 2.3), and (iii) interbank settlement and credit system
(Section 2.4).
Figure 1 summarises the model timing where these three dimensions combine and operate.
After initialisation (τ = 0), the flow of payments is performed across customer accounts, while
involved banks settle these payments through two distinctive procedures (τ = 1). At the next
step (τ = 2 and 3), past customer loans are repaid while new ones are granted according to
two alternative lending strategies that are based upon the available reserves in distinctive ways
(respectively labeled money multiplication and fractional reserve). At the third step (τ = 4
and 5), evolving networks of banks pool available reserves together according to the respective
reserve need and excess at that point of time. This pooling mechanism depends on interbank
coordination quality and bank outstanding positions, both evolving over time and circumstances
captured by the parameter space.
2.1 Setting the scene (INITIALISATION)
Our miniature financial system comprises the following agent types:
 A whole of customers {cj , j = 1...C}, which order payments over time periods t, while asking
for bank loans and repaying them over time periods h >= t. For the sake of simplicity,
we may assume that h = t without generality loss.
 A system of monetary financial institutions (banks) {bi, i = 1...B}, which perform payments
on behalf of other agents, and grant credits to customers and to each other.
 One Central Bank, which issues an exogenous quantity of currency A1 and acts as guarantor
of last resort if one bank remains exposed to other banks after interbank settlement and
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Figure 1: Flowchart summarizing the model structure and steps.
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credit.
Each bank balance sheet contains five kinds of assets and related liabilities (Table 1).
Table 1: Bank balance sheet items
Asset Liability
A1: Currency Reserves L1: Deposit (Base Money)
A2: Retail Loan L2: Deposit (Retail Loan)
A3: Interbank Lending L3: Interbank Borrowing
A4: Equity Reserve L4: Equity Provision
A5: Central Bank Assistance L5: Central Bank Guarantee
Concerning initialization, we distribute every customer j’s deposit (l1i,j,t) to any bank i ran-
domly. The initial amount of base money A10 is split equally across customer deposits (l1i,j,t =
A10/C). Moreover, total equity A40 is allocated equally across banks (A4i,t = L4i,t = A40/B).
The following individual bank balance sheet identity holds at every time period t (including
initialization step t = 0):
A1i,t +A2i,t +A3i,t = L1i,t + L2i,t + L3i,t
A4i,t = L4i,t
A5i,t = L5i,t
(1)
This miniature economy has a total base money A1 =
∑B
i A1i,t=0 =
∑B
i
∑C
j l1i,j,t=0 that is
distributed equally to C customers, and a total bank capital
∑B
i L4i,t=0 that is distributed
equally to B banks. Customers deposit all of their money to individual banks, based on a fixed
transition/selection matrix MC→B = (mcj→bi)C×B (where mcj→bi = 1 if bi is the bank of cj ,
else mcj→bi = 0). At time t = 0, the initial capital L4i,t=0 of bank i is provided, which also adds
to its initial equity reserve A4i,t=0 (the size of banks can be calibrated equally or follow some
distribution in line with empirical evidence). The initial total deposit from customers cj,j∈{C}
to their bank bi,i∈{B} is L1i,t=0 =
∑
j l1i,j where deposited currency is issued by the central
monetary authority (assuming all customers’ money is stored in banks, no cash in hand outside
the banking system), adding to the initial base money cash reserve A1i,t=0 of bank i (the initial
money deposit by customers can be calibrated equally or follow some distribution in line with
empirical evidence). There is no initial loan to customers A2i,t=0 = 0 and L2i,t=0 = 0, no
interbank lending A3i,t=0 = 0 or borrowing L3i,t=0 = 0, no central bank assistance A5i,t=0 = 0
or guarantee L5i,t=0 = 0. Therefore, the initial individual bank balance sheet identity is:
A1i,t=0 = L1i,t=0
A4i,t=0 = L4i,t=0
(2)
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where A1i,t=0 = L1i,t=0 =
∑
j l1i,j,t=0 and l1i,j,t is a customer j’s individual cash deposit in own
bank i at time t.
Since our analysis focuses on financial stability implications of interbank coordination, we as-
sume that equity (A4/L4) and central bank (A5/L5) provisions are non-cash based, that is,
they do not modify reserve base holdings and obligations over time and circumstances. A fur-
ther extension may consider an additional set of minimal institutions to design and implement
equity payments and central bank monetary interventions.
Concerning bank equity capitalisation, for the sake of simplicity and in line with Delli Gatti
et al. (2010), we fix the number of banks and customers (i.e. exogenous) and we allocate eq-
uity capital equally across banks. Simulations start from identical initial conditions, but agents
become rapidly heterogeneous throughout interactions. In some circumstances, banks may ex-
perience losses and then exhaust their initial equity provision. For the sake of simplicity, we let
survive and keep operating banks with negative equity, using total equity loss as an indicator
of financial distress for the single bank and the financial system as a whole. On the contrary,
Delli Gatti et al. (2010) replace defaulted banks with new banks having small capital relative
to the size of other solvent banks.
The model further disentangles ongoing banking activity through a sequence of three dynamic
modules: (1) Payments flow (money circulation across customers, where banks facilitate pay-
ments over space and time); (2) Lending to real economy (banks are loan creators through
long-term retail loans); (3) Interbank coordination (through both interbank credit, and central
bank assistance as a residual balance device).
2.2 Model Module 1: Payments system
In our miniature economy, customers cj may use currency A1 to perform payments across them.
When this occurs, the bank of the customer x which orders to pay does transfer customer cur-
rency reserve A1x,t while reducing customer currency deposit L1x,t. Conversely, the bank of
the customer y which receives the payment does increase the customer currency deposit L1y,t
and customer currency reserve A1y,t. In this way, banks act as passive fiduciary depositors of
customer holdings of currency.
Moreover, due to functional equivalence between cash and bank deposit, customers cj may
use their bank deposit L2j,t to perform payments. Customer bank deposits are created when
their bank grants a loan A2j,h to them. When bank deposit wire transfer occurs, the bank of
the customer x which orders to pay does reduce the customer bank deposit L1x,t by requested
payment amount. Conversely, the bank of the customer y which receives the payment does
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increase the customer bank deposit L1y,t. However, by assumption, banks do not transfer cur-
rency reserves against bank deposit transfers. Instead, banks agree to grant interbank lending
and borrowing of same amount. The payer’s bank then borrows from the payee’s bank, adding
to its interbank liability L3x,t, while the payee’s bank lends to its paying counterparty, adding
to its interbank loan portfolio A3y,t. This mechanism reproduces the settlement mechanism
that is generally in place for banks through central bank facilities (McLeay et al., 2014; Rule,
2015).
Initial exogenous quantity of central bank currency A10 was equally distributed across cus-
tomers and it now moves stochastically across them through time periods t. All cash holdings
A1 are held by financial institutions. Payments across customers settled in currency are gener-
ated through a random markov transition matrix across customer bank accounts.
Customers perform two kinds of payments in this module: (1) cash payments through cur-
rency transfers from the banks of paying customers to the banks of receiving customers (i.e.
updating both A1i,t and L1i,t in the banks’ balance sheet); (2) bank wire transfers that pay
through bank deposits L2i,t rather than transferring cash.
2.2.1 Customers’ cash payment (A1/L1 update)
When modeling the first kind of payment (i.e. cash), a stochastic Markov transition matrix
M˜cx→cy is used to describe the transition of cash payments across the customers’ whole C. Each
of its entries m˜x→y represents the probability of a customer cx, x ∈ C to pay another customer
cy, y ∈ C, therefore 0 ≤ m˜x→y ≤ 1 and
∑
y m˜x→y = 1. (This means that the sum of each row
in M˜cx→cy is the total pay-out from a customer’s existing cash deposit, and the sum of each
column is the total pay-in from other customers that adds to a customer’s next total deposit.)
A parameter ξ1 ∈ [0, 1] controls the scale of customers’ cash payment. This design implicitly
assumes that customers are constrained by their cash deposit. Also, their net cash flow (re-
sulting from balance between cash payable and receivable) is both small and stochastic over time.
Hence, across customers:
{cx} ξ1−→ {M˜cx→cy} −→ {cy} ⇒ ∆l1x→y,t (3)
In parallel, the bank of customer cx transfers an amount ∆l1x→y,t of A1 to the bank of customer
cy, and reduces the cash deposit of cx accordingly. In aggregate, every bank performs netting
between total cash-in and cash-out, updating both sides of their balance sheet as follows:
∆A1i,t = ∆L1i,t =
∑
y∈{m˜y→x>0}
∆l1y→x,t −
∑
x∈{m˜x→y>0}
∆l1x→y,t (4)
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where cx is the customer of bank i and cy may be any customer of other banks.
2.2.2 Customers’ bank credit wire transfer (L2 and A3/L3 update)
Concerning the second kind of payment (i.e. bank loan deposit wire transfer), a similar stochas-
tic Markov transition matrix is used to describe the wire transfer payment transitions. In this
case, customers use their loan deposits l2i,j,t to perform their payments.
Therefore, among the customers:
{cx} −→ {M˜cx→cy} −→ {cy} ⇒ ∆l2x→y,t (5)
However, there are two differences with cash payment transfers: (1) Although the payments are
exchanged between customers, the actual net of credit transactions are across banks. Therefore,
a new transition matrix M˜bu→bv is used to model the interbank credit net transition (i.e.: the
net of total customer deposits in and out a certain pair of banks (u, v)). (2) Since customers
can borrow from their banks to pay other customers through bank credit, they are constrained
by the loan l2i,j,t granted by their own banks. A parameter ξ2 ∈ [0, 1] controls the scale of this
transition.
{bu} ξ2−→ {M˜bu→bv} −→ {bv} ⇒ ∆L2u→v,t (6)
where ∆L2u→v,t ≤ L2u,t for all banks. Each pair of banks perform clearing and settlement of
these wire payments in two steps. First, the two banks net mutual opposite positions against
each other. Second, they agree to transform the net residual difference in interbank lending and
borrowing.
Therefore, the netting transaction between any pair of banks (u, v) is:
∆L2u,v,t = ∆L2u→v,t −∆L2v→u,t, ∀(u, v), t (7)
where each bank pair (u, v) deposit movement from bank to bank is the sum of customers in
one bank paying to customers in the other bank. For instance, for payments from bank u to
bank v: ∆L2u→v,t =
∑
cx∈bu,cy∈bv ∆l2x→y,t. In aggregate, every bank sums up all these net wire
payments with other banks and updates its L2i,t:
∆L2u,t =
∑
v∈{m˜u→v>0}
(
∆L2u→v,t −∆L2v→u,t
)
(8)
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if ∆L2u,t > 0, then bank u increases its L2, else if ∆L2u,t < 0, then it decreases its L2. In
parallel, banks update their interbank credit (A3 and L3) across them:{
∆A3u,t = ∆L2u,t, if ∆L2u,t > 0
∆L3u,t = −∆L2u,t, if ∆L2u,t < 0.
(9)
These new amounts of interbank credit are recorded as a pair (u, v) between every two banks.
They add to the other A3 and L3 that will be created in the interbank credit pool network and
repaid all together later on.
2.3 Model Module 2: Bank credit creation and destruction
While dealing with the payments system on behalf of its customers, each and every bank
experiences that an ongoing core of its reserve holdings A∗i,t ∈ {A1i,t, A2i,t, A3i,t} remains rel-
atively stable over time. Under the functional equivalence between currency and deposit, every
bank acquires the capacity or the privilege to use these holdings, while they remain available
to the agents that have borrowed from the bank. Its borrowers may be either its customers
{L1j,t, L2j,t} or other banks (L3j,t). This implies that the bank holds an ongoing safety net on
which its lending activity may lever upon.
For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that each bank lending
department does plan to lend to its customers only. Before seeking to grant new loans, each
bank receives loan repayments from customers which borrowed in the past.
2.3.1 Customers’ loan repayments (A2/L2 update)
In line with bank loan repayment mechanism introduced by Xiong et al. (2017), customers loan
repayment follows the following procedure. Generating a stochastic repayment ratio Ψ˜i,t for
each bank based on a Triangular Distribution (depending on the lower ψL, peak ψP and upper
ψU parameters):
Ψ˜i,t(ψL, ψP , ψU ) ∼ Triangular(ψL, ψP , ψU ) (10)
The loan is repaid based on the following repayment formula:
Repayment∆L2i,t = Ψ˜i,t · L2i,t (11)
This statistical distribution implies an average loan outstanding time of (ψL +ψP +ψU )/3 and
a modal loan outstanding time of ψP . Since banks only lend to own customers, this mechanism
implies simple reverse lending as both A2i,t and L2i,t are reduced by Repayment∆L2i,t in the
bank i balance sheet, where L2i,t is the existing loan portfolio of that bank. This mechanism
treats the real economy as a whole, without tracking individual customers and then individual
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loans granted to them. In principle, each loan has its terms and conditions, including its own
duration and repayment profile. This involves that, at each period of time, each bank is con-
fronted with a portfolio of loans of different durations and repayment profiles. To capture this
feature without tracking each loan, we move from a universal repayment ratio for every bank
as in Xiong et al. (2017) to a stochastic one for each bank. Its statistical distribution denotes
the ongoing customer credit conditions in real economy. A further extension of the model may
consider here stylised facts from empirical evidence on business cycles (Kollintzas et al., 2011).
The model is calibrated to avoid customers default on their loans, implying that L2i,t ≥
∆L2i,t, ∀i, t (as in Equation 11 above). A further extension may consider an additional set
of minimal institutions to feature customer default resolution arrangements (Goodhart et al.,
2016).
2.3.2 Customer loan creation
After being repaid for previous loans, banks seek to grant new loans to their customers. The
model denotes two distinctive lending strategies, namely money multiplication and fractional
reserve lending.
Lending Behaviour 1: Bank money multiplication lending mechanism
Based on the target reserve ratio γTRi,t and the existing “total reserve holding”
∑
A∗i,t, the
maximum of total credit that each bank can grant is:
γTRi,t =
∑
A∗i,t
Maximum Lending
⇒ Maximum Lending =
∑
A∗i,t
γTRi,t
(12)
The existing total deposit being {L1+L2+L3}i,t, each bank wishes to lend a multiple of “total
reserve base” to keep new and existing loans below the maximum level, so that
∆A2i,t+1 ≤
∑
A∗i,t
γTRi,t
− {L1 + L2 + L3}i,t (13)
with ∆A2 = ∆L2 by construction, if the potential lending offer is actually granted. If so, A2
and L2 will be updated symmetrically by the granted amount.
Therefore, the general formula of target lending under money multiplication is:
Potential∆A2i,t+1 = Max
{
0 ,
∑
A∗i,t
γTRi,t
− (L1i,t + L2i,t + L3i,t)
}
(14)
13
This formula implies that banks wish to maintain an ongoing safety net proportional to their
loan outstanding {L1 + L2 + L3}i,t. This restrictive condition may be relaxed by assuming
{L1 + L2}i,t, making interbank credit free from reserve corporate targeting or regulatory re-
strictions.
The target reserve parameter γTRi,t captures the bank treasury management policy which aims
to maintain an ongoing safety net between cash inflows and holdings, and cash outflows and
obligations. This target may include the minimum reserve ratio required by banking law and
regulation (γRR), the latter being a threshold that is universal across banks, and may evolve
over time and circumstances.
Various definitions of reserve base
∑
A∗i,t involve featuring notions of the ultimate means
of payment and settlement. When A1 only is retained, a narrow monetary system is defined
that restricts money functions to currency. When A1 and A3 are jointly retained, a broader
monetary system enables banks to settle interbank payments through mutual credit admittances
over time and circumstances. When A2 is introduced, a mechanism of loan securitisation is in
place, enabling banks to increase their liquidity (defined as held reserve base) through refinanc-
ing on and securitisation of their asset holdings. In the rest of this article, we maintain a broad
definition of reserve base including A1 and A3 (broad monetary system).
The above equation compares with the textbook representation for fractional reserve lending of
loanable funds as follows:
Lending Behaviour 2: Fractional reserve under loanable funds constraint
Based on current amounts of the bank reserve base (
∑
A∗i,t) and total deposit {L1+L2+L3}i,t,
individual banks calculate their own target (required) reserves TRi,t (i.e.: the target reserve to
deal with potential deposit withdrawals):
TRi,t = γ
TR
i,t × (L1i,t + L2i,t + L3i,t) (15)
where γTRi,t is the target reserve ratio for bank i at time period t.
Each bank wishes to lend the share of total currently held reserve base to customers as new
retail loans (∆A2i,t+1) above the following target reserve threshold:
∆A2i,t+1 =
∑
A∗i,t − TRi,t (16)
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Therefore the general formula of target lending is:
Potential∆A2i,t+1 = Max
{
0 ,
∑
A∗i,t − γTRi,t · (L1i,t + L2i,t + L3i,t)
}
(17)
In particular, the banking theory as pure intermediation of loanable funds imposes that only
A1 is included in the reserve base
∑
A∗i,t.
2.3.3 Bank credit realisation
Both lending strategies denote the ongoing bank potential offer of loans to customers at time
period h ≥ t. Banks potential offer of loans is satisfied according to the following aggregate
absorption function by customers as a whole.
Hence, the actual granted loan is:
Actual∆A2i,t+1 = Θ˜i,t · Potential∆A2i,t+1 (18)
where the proportion of potential lending Θ˜i,t is generated randomly from a triangular distri-
bution (with the following lower, peak, and upper parameter):
Θ˜i,t(θL, θP , θU ) ∼ Triangular(θL, θP , θU ) (19)
This statistical distribution implies an average loan absorption of (θL+θP +θU )/3 and a modal
loan absorption of θP at each period. These parameters capture ongoing customer credit con-
ditions in bank lending activity over time and circumstances. For the sake of simplicity and
without generality loss, we treat customers as a whole, disregarding individual customer pat-
terns of bank loan granted, spent and repaid. A further extension may introduce a set of
minimal institutions to design and implement real economy uses and fate of bank credit money.
Once each bank i gets its actual share of granted loans, it allocates them to its customers
j, increasing simultaneously both bank loan asset portfolio (A2j,h) and bank customer deposits
(L2j,h).
2.4 Model Module 3: Interbank settlement and credit system
Both payments settlement (module 1) over time periods t, and bank credit creation and de-
struction (module 2) over time periods h reshape bank outstanding asset holdings and liability
obligations throughout time and space. This ongoing dynamic requires the bank treasury de-
partment to manage the bank financial process to rebalance cash (and cash equivalents) outflows
and inflows, seeking to maintain ongoing bank capacity to settle obligations when they become
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due in time and amount. As for banks hold reserves to settle payments and meet reserve re-
quirements (Fullwiler, 2008). Generally speaking, this ongoing rebalancing activity is performed
through interbank borrowing and lending. When a bank lends to another bank, bank balance
sheet simultaneously expands with the loan (an asset to the bank) and the deposit (a liability to
the bank), both in the name of the other bank, while the bank promises to make the borrowing
bank deposit redeemable in cash or cash equivalents (that is, whatever asset A∗ is included in
the reserve base definition
∑
A∗).
The following modeling strategy focuses on outstanding amounts of reserve need and excess, and
the matching mechanism that enables potential borrowers (banks with reserve need) to meet
potential lenders (banks with reserve excess). For the sake of simplicity and without generality
loss, we neglect the impact of interbank interest rates (including margins) in this matching pro-
cess. Empirical evidence seems to suggest that interbank credit networks rely on longstanding
partnership and are quite unresponsive to counterparty risk in normal times (Finger and Lux,
2014). An extension of the model may include further stylised facts concerning interbank credit
conditions and circumstances.
2.4.1 Interbank credit repayment system
Before seeking for new interbank lending and borrowing, all the banks repay their outstanding
loans L3 that have become due in period t according to the following steps:
Step 1: Each bank records its outstanding interbank lending and borrowing over time, so every
loan has one-to-one match between a lender and a borrower at a particular time t;
Step 2: At each time period, some randomly selected loans come to be repaid (selected from all
outstanding loans through all historical periods), depending on the interbank repayment
likelihood parameter ωi,t;
Step 3: The control parameter ωi,t for each bank i at time period t denotes the likelihood of
repayment and may vary over time and circumstances;
Step 4: The repayment is settled by the repaying bank through a proportional transfer of its
reserve base components A∗: for the lender, it decreases its interbank lending item A3
and increases its reserve base A∗; for the borrower, it decreases its interbank borrowing
item L3 and decreases its reserve base components A∗;
Step 5: After interbank loan repayment, each bank updates its record of outstanding interbank
lending and borrowing.
This simple repayment mechanism is sufficient to denote interbank credit dynamics. A further
extension of the model may transform this mechanism in a more sophisticated treasury man-
agement function by each bank, and more sophisticated institutional arrangements to frame
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this management over time and circumstances.
The model implements interbank repayment as follows.
A 3-dimension matrix MB×B×T records all outstanding interbank loans (generated through
customers’ bank credit wire transfer and credit coordination in interbank networking). An
outstanding loan is recorded as mu→v,t > 0, ∀m ∈ MB×B×T , otherwise if mu→v,t = 0 loan is
absent). At each time, another random 3-dimension matrix D˜B×B×T is generated where each
element d˜u,v,t is drawn from a uniform distribution ∼ U(0, 1).
The repayment that triggers threshold in the repayment decision matrix D˜B×B×T is fixed as
follows:
d˜u,v,t > ωu,t, ∀(u, v) ∈ {mu→v,t > 0} (20)
(where ωu,t parameter controls for interbank repayment probability, i.e. a higher ωu,t means
that interbank loans are repaid more slowly implying a longer duration on average, and (u, v)
identifies a pair of lender-borrower.)
When the repayment is triggered, bank u repays interbank loan mu→v,t where d˜u,v,t > ωu,t,
therefore mu→v,t becomes zero, and the repayment is paid back to the previous lending bank v
adding to its reserve base
∑
A∗i,t in proportion to reserve base components of repaying bank u.
Borrower reserve accounts A∗ decrease and may become zero for A1 and negative for other A∗
because of this repayment. Indeed the repaying bank may seek to recover from this exposure
through further inter-bank borrowing.
The balance sheet items (A3/L3/A∗) are updated as follows:
• Once a pair of lender-borrower (u, v) is selected to repay the outstanding loan mu→v,τ ,
the lender u’s A3u,t and the borrower v’s L3v,t at the current period are reduced by each
mu→v,τ ,∀τ ∈ {1...t}.
• Each pair (u, v, τ) also identifies the weights of different reserve base component at time τ
as A∗i,τ /
∑
A∗i,τ , so the lender u’s each reserve base component A∗u,t is increased, while
the borrower v’s each reserve base component A∗v,t is reduced in proportion to reserve
components at current period levels.
• This process is repeated for all selected outstanding loans mu,v,τ ,∀u, v, τ .
After interbank repayment settlements, banks with outstanding excess reserve holdings may
seek to lend, while banks with outstanding reserve must seek to borrow. In this context, a
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minimal reserve requirement implies a balance threshold higher than zero to distinguish between
potential lenders and borrowers.
2.4.2 Interbank credit pooling system
This section introduces the dynamic interactions of interbank credit coordination. Both the
completeness and perfection of this pooling system is managed by an interbank credit control
parameter φ ∈ [0, 1]. This parameter describes interbank credit conditions and especially points
to counterparty risk in bilateral and multilateral transactions within bank networks. In par-
ticular, with φ = 0 the system works under complete and perfect pooling, while with φ = 1
the system does not experience any interbank credit. A system is complete when all banks
can potentially become borrowers and lenders. A system is perfect when all banks do actually
become either borrowers or lenders. In section 4, simulation analysis will comparatively assess
the system working against different levels of incomplete and imperfect coordination modes,
inferring systemic implications of interbank coordination for financial stability and resilience.
The inter-bank coordination quality parameter φi,t may be settled at different values across
banks i and time periods t. For the sake of simplicity, our simulation analysis shall denote it
through one universal value for all i, t.
Therefore, our interbank credit pooling mechanism enables controlling how potential lenders
and borrowers match over time and circumstances captured by the parameter space. In partic-
ular, it may occur that some potential lenders cannot fully lend since borrowers are not found.
Viceversa, some potential borrowers may find insufficient lending to satisfy their reserve need.
When a potential lender cannot find sufficient borrowing requests, its reserve surplus remains
unexploited. Even the central bank does not absorb those excess reserves. When a potential
borrower cannot find sufficient lending offers, it shall have recourse to the central bank guaran-
tee, in order to continue operating through the next period.
Interbank credit coordination mechanism is implemented as follows:
Calculating reserve situation: Based on its individual bank target reserve ratio γTRi,t and its
own current reserve base level (
∑
A∗i,t), each bank identifies its reserve surplus (denoting
a potential lender) or shortage (denoting a potential borrower).
The current reserve ratio of a bank i (all balance sheet items being updated up to this
step) is:
γCRi,t =
∑
A∗i,t
L1i,t + L2i,t + L3i,t
(21)
18
The bank excess reserve (surplus) when γCRi,t > γ
TR
i,t is:
ERi,t = (γ
CR
i,t − γTRi,t ) · (L1i,t + L2i,t + L3i,t) (22)
The bank reserve need (shortage) when γCRi,t < γ
TR
i,t is:
RNi,t = (γ
TR
i,t − γCRi,t ) · (L1i,t + L2i,t + L3i,t) (23)
Calculating weights of reserve bases: since the balance sheet comprises different reserve
base components A∗i,t ∈ {A1i,t, A2i,t, A3i,t} which may be used for interbank settlement
proportionally to their relative weight in
∑
A∗i,t, we compute and record the share of each
reserve base component in the total reserve for each bank. When issuing or repaying the
interbank loan, the reserve base components will be updated according to these weight:
WeightA∗i,t =
A∗i,t∑
A∗i,t (24)
Generating a potential lender-borrower matrix: All banks are now separated into two
groups (i.e. lenders and borrowers). The system forms a matrix MB×B (B being the
total number of banks), lending banks being marked as 1 into the rows, and borrowing
banks being marked as 1 into the columns. When a lending bank finds a borrowing bank,
their cells in the matrix have both column and row as 1. Hence, this matrix defines
all combinations of potential lenders and borrowers. When a lending bank l matches
a borrowing bank b, then the element ml→b = 1,m ∈ MB×B, defining a pair (l, b). A
bank with excess reserve is a potential lender for all borrowers (who need reserve), and
vice-versa. Therefore,
ml→b = 1, ∀l ∈ B{γCRi,t > γTRi,t } ∩ ∀b ∈ B{γCRi,t < γTRi,t } (25)
Generating an actual lender-borrower matrix: Another B × B matrix is used to define
the actual pair of lender-borrower. The system creates a random probability selection
matrix M˜probB×B, whose element m˜
p
l,b may be generated by “exogenous random matching”.
This approach draws the actual matching matrix elements from uniform distribution as
follows:
m˜pl,b ∼ U(0, 1) (26)
Comparing with Delli Gatti et al. (2010), our model has few differences: (1) our model
extends the loan repayment duration to multiple periods (via a stochastic loan repayment
ratio ωi,t); (2) our model extends to multi-lenders with multi-borrowers where each lender
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has a limited funding; (3) they analyze the impact of lending (revenue: interest, or loss:
bad debt) on bank profit and loss statement, while we focus on the impact of loan trans-
actions on bank balance sheet dynamics.
Having generated all probabilities for all potential pairs of lender-borrower (l, b), we se-
lect those pairs whose probabilities are larger than a threshold to form actual subsets of
interbank networks:
m˜pl,b > φt, with φt ∈ [0, 1] (27)
This threshold parameter φt controls for the degree of imperfect pooling (i.e.: if φt = 0,
then the network realises perfect pooling). This design enables selecting multi-lenders
with limited funding, contrary to Delli Gatti et al. (2010) which introduce only one lender
with unlimited funding available.
Allocating reserve within subsets of interbank networks: The actual selection matrix
may contain either borrowers (lenders) who could not find lenders (borrowers), or bor-
rowers (lenders) who have one or more lenders (borrowers). Each borrower decides to
borrow in proportion to its reserve shortage from the group of its actual lenders based on
those lenders’ total excess reserve. Borrowers request the needed amount of reserve from
their actual lenders. Each lender forms a subgroup between itself and its actual borrowers.
This means that borrowers and lenders form subsets of interbank credit networks where
banks coordinate their reserve need and excess for the period t being. Since interbank
loans may last for some periods, this makes interbank credit networks evolving over time
and circumstances captured by the parameter space.
Updating bank balance sheet items: If a pair of lender-borrower (l, b) performs interbank
credit for an amount ∆A3l→b,t = ∆L3l→b,t, then the lender’s A3l,t and borrower’s L3b,t
are increased by this amount. At the same time, the settled amount of reserves A∗ is
moved from the lender’s to the borrower’s balance sheet. This operation implies interbank
settlement on a gross basis and is repeated for each paired transaction. Borrowers and
lenders constitute interbank pooling networks.
Recording interbank loans in the repayment matrix: Actual new interbank loan trans-
actions at this period t between lenders and borrowers are recorded in the 3-Dimension
matrix MB×B×T , together with all the other outstanding interbank credits and debts. If
the interbank reserve surplus is not fully employed within a subgroup, the lenders leave the
remaining amount unexploited. Viceversa, if the interbank loan need is not fully satisfied
within a subgroup, the borrowers ask the central bank for overdraft assistance.
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2.5 Central bank as guarantor of last resort
In some circumstances, the model dynamic makes possible that, after interbank credit coordi-
nation, one bank remains exposed, that is, it remains unable to match its reserve base targets
and obligations in that time period t.
In this situation, the model introduces a non-cash central bank facility that provides a guaran-
tee of last resort, enabling the exposed bank to roll over its overdraft obligations until the next
period t+ 1. For the sake of simplicity, this facility is non-cash based, that is, it does not enter
the reserve base dotation of the exposed bank, which must pay a punitive guarantee fee on this
contingent liability A5i,t outstanding. This modeling strategy is consistent with overdraft facil-
ities provided by major central banks (Fullwiler, 2008). This modelling strategy helps focusing
the model dynamic on the direct effect of interbank credit that is under examination in this
article. Central bank exposure provides a signal for financial instability and fragility generated
by both bank excess behaviours and interbank lacks of coordination. A further extension of the
model may include a set of minimal institutions to design and implement central bank monetary
interventions and monetary financial institution defaults.
If a bank remains in reserve shortage after interbank credit coordination, that is,
∑
A∗ is
less than target reserve TRi,t, the central bank provides a guarantee L5i,t to complete the level
of reserves with:
A5i,t = L5i,t
Therefore: ∑
A∗i,t +A5i,t = TRi,t (28)
The assisted bank pays an overdraft guarantee fee on the central bank assistance, as follows:
pii,t = pii,t−1 − rL5i,t · L5i,t (29)
where rL5i,t is equal to the interbank rate r
L3
i,t plus a punitive spread.
This assistance from the central bank is fully removed at the beginning of the next period
t+ 1 as follows:
∆A5i,t+1 = ∆L5i,t+1 = −L5i,t (30)
Therefore, the total outstanding position L5 taken by the central bank on the whole banking
system at time t is updated as follows:
L5t+1 = L5t −
∑
i
L5i,t−1 +
∑
i
∆L5i,t (31)
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2.6 Bank Equity dynamics
Bank equity was initialized by non-cash provision equally distributed across banks. We further
model equity dynamics period through period. Following Xu et al. (2016), fee and interest rates
of reference fluctuate according to exogenous stochastic distributions. A further extension of
the model may include a set of minimal institutions to design and implement interdependency
between these rates and underlying banking and financial conditions and circumstances.
Once bank balance sheets have been updated by all the four steps (payments settlement; bank
credit creation and destruction; interbank settlement and credit; central bank guarantee), each
bank accrues non-cash movements to its income statement as follows:
 Concerning bank lending department with customers:
• Borrowing interest rates paid to customers over outstanding currency deposit L1
• Management fees as expense to customers over held currency deposits A1
• Borrowing interest rates paid to customers over outstanding currency deposit L2
• Lending interest charges as revenues from customers over outstanding loans A2
 Concerning interbank lending and borrowing:
• Interbank lending interest charges as revenues from borrowing banks over outstanding
interbank credits A3. Conversely, the same amounts become expenses for borrowing
banks.
• Interbank borrowing interest charges as expenses to lending banks over outstanding
loans L3. Conversely, the same amounts become revenues of lending banks.
 Guarantee fees as expenses incurred by the guaranteed bank over temporary central bank
assistance L5
Bank equity is updated as follows:
L4i,t = A4i,t = L4i,t−1 + pii,t (32)
where profit pii,t is the sum of all these movements as follows:
pii,t = (r
A1
i,t A1i,t + r
A2
i,t A2i,t + r
A3
i,t A3i,t)− (rL1i,t L1i,t + rL2i,t L2i,t + rL3i,t L3i,t + rL5i,t L5i,t) (33)
where rA3i,t and r
L3
i,t are equal for each pair between lender and borrower.
As bank balance sheet amounts evolve according to their own movements over time and cir-
cumstances, this equity dynamic enables to capture ongoing impact of various bank activities
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on bank profits and losses. For the sake of simplicity, this dynamics is non-cash based, that is,
it does not enter the bank reserve base donation period through period and it is not distributed
to management and shareholders. This modelling strategy helps focusing the model dynamic
on the direct effect of interbank credit that is under examination in this article. Bank equity
dynamic provides a signal for financial resilience, showing the ongoing capacity of each bank and
the banking system as a whole to face possible credit losses. A further extension of the model
may include a set of minimal institutions to design and implement cash equity transactions,
including transactions with shareholders and bank default resolutions.
The Table 2 summarizes key parameters, and their benchmark values and features. Figure 1 vi-
sualises the model structure and dynamics. The model dynamics is driven by several stochastic
processes for payments flows, bank costumer loans repayment and generation, and interbank
credit repayment and granting. In particular, this baseline scenario calibration scopes out
bankruptcy of customers and banks, in order to focus our simulation results on the direct ef-
fects of interbank coordination over time and circumstances. For the same reason, the total
base money provided by the central bank A1 is kept constant throughout all the periods and
replications.
Table 2: Summary of parameters and values in the model
Parameter Description Benchmark Variation Baseline Calibration (Section 4)
T Total time periods Fixed 50
B Total number of banks Fixed 10
C Total number of customers Fixed 1000
A10 Total base money 1× 109 Fixed 1× 109
A40 Total capital of all banks 1× 108 Fixed 1× 108
rA1i,t Interest rate of asset A1 0.01 [0.005, 0.015] ∼ Triangular(0.005, 0.01, 0.015)
rA2i,t Interest rate of asset A2 0.03 [0.02, 0.04] ∼ Triangular(0.02, 0.03, 0.04)
rA3i,t Interest rate of asset A3 0.015 [0.005, 0.025] ∼ Triangular(0.005, 0.015, 0.025)
rL1i,t Interest rate of liability L1 0.01 [0.005, 0.015] ∼ Triangular(0.005, 0.01, 0.015)
rL2i,t Interest rate of liability L2 0.01 [0.005, 0.015] ∼ Triangular(0.005, 0.01, 0.015)
rL3i,t Interest rate of liability L3 0.015 [0.005, 0.025] ∼ Triangular(0.005, 0.015, 0.025)
rL5i,t Interest rate of liability L5 r
L3
i,t + 0.03 [0.035, 0.055] r
L3
i,t + 0.03
γRR Bank required reserve ratio 0.1 Fixed 0.1
γTRi,t Bank target reserve ratio γ
RR + z˜ Stochastic γRR
α Partner selection not used Fixed n/a in “Exogenous matching”
λ Partner selection not used Fixed n/a in “Exogenous matching”
φi,t Interbank credit pooling quality 0 [0,1] 0/0.4/0.8
θL, θP , θU Actual customer loan creation (0,0.5,1) [0,1] ∼ Triangular(0, 0.8, 1)
ψL, ψP , ψU Customer loan repayment (0,0.5,1) [0,1] ∼ Triangular(0, 0.5, 1)
ωi,t Interbank loan repayment (0,0.5,1) [0,1] 0.5
ξ1 Scale of customers’ cash payment 0.1 [0,1] 0.1
ξ2 Scale of bank credit wire transfer 0.1 [0,1] 0.1
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3 Interbank credit and the money generation process
Our model features the connection between money as a means of payment and bank credit gen-
eration. In particular, banks define their lending strategy in relation to their ongoing capacity
to face payment settlement obligations over time and circumstances. This implies that banks
watch over ongoing inflows and outflows of means of payment (cash and cash equivalents) in
order to target their ongoing potential capacity to offer loans period through period. In this
context, bank reserve holdings are defined through whatever bank assets A∗ that may be used
to settle payments with other banks. These assets jointly define the reserve base that the bank
takes into account to decide its lending capacity through leverage, enabling its contribution to
the money multiplication process. Schumpeter (1954, pp. 320) masterly denotes this process
as money manufacturing. In this context, “banks are no longer said to ‘lend their deposits’
or ‘other people’s money,’ but to ‘create’ deposits or bank notes: they appear to manufacture
money rather than to increase its velocity or to act, which is a completely unrealistic idea, on
behalf of their depositors.”
According to textbook story of money creation under fractional reserves and available loan-
able funds, interbank credit is relegated to the backyard of the banking system. It may be
considered as a minor mechanism that enables banks to temporarily postpone payments in or-
der to facilitate settlement and clearing across banks, with no impact on the overall working
of the banking system. Our model is capable to reproduce this narrow monetary system as a
cornerstone case which occurs when the reserve base
∑
A∗ is narrowly defined as currency only,
that is, A1. This case may be tested under both lending mechanisms (Equation 17 and 14)
which feature fractional reserve and money multiplication processes. Under both mechanisms,
narrow reserve definition and related management define the limits of the banking system money
capacitance. Figure 2 illustrates this result.
However, the functional equivalence between currency and deposit introduces an additional
source of money creation into the financial system. This source comes from the working bank-
ing system which, through interbank credit, makes itself potentially independent from base
money issued by central banking. Heuristically, this may happen not only when central bank-
ing expands its reserve base definition to admit bank securities and bank credit admittances
(A3i,t) to its refinancing facilities, but also when banks keep renewing drawing facilities to each
other (L3i,t), or keep issuing credit admittances (A3i,t) that circulate as cash equivalents for
settling interbank payments over time. Figure 3 illustrates this scenario.
Under ideal conditions similar to the textbook case (Figure 3 case: left diagram), broad in-
terbank credit mechanism involves two featuring results that contrast with received textbook
story. According to the latter, interbank credit does not matter and the aggregate money
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creation is bound by the outstanding reserve base issued by the central bank (high powered
money). In contrast, on the one hand, a banking system embedded into a broad monetary
system generates an additional money aggregate made of interbank credit money which com-
plements both bank credit money and currency money aggregates. On the other hand, such a
banking system makes the potential offer of bank credit potentially unbound (Figure 3 cases:
middle and right diagrams). Therefore, interbank credit can remove the inner limits of the
monetary system capacitance in this configuration.
These featuring results pave the way to a better understanding of systemic implications of
interbank credit for financial stability and resilience. As for interbank credit generates addi-
tional aggregate money while increasing bank leverage and exposure. It further expands bank
credit capacity potentially without limits or, better, within evolving limits endogenously im-
posed by real economy absorption and institutional arrangements. The next section applies this
model to assess the impact on financial stability and resilience by this broad banking system
under conditions of incomplete and imperfect interbank credit pooling.
Figure 2: Money aggregates analysis under narrow banking: both visualizations are generated, when the interbank
coordination is in perfect pooling, all banks use A1 as the reserve base (i.e. narrow banking), no repayment of
customer loans, the interbank loans are repaid randomly and on average repaid fully in two time periods. Other
parameters follow the baseline scenario in Table 2. Left diagram shows the simulation result when all banks’
lending strategy is based on the conventional rule of fractional reserve (Equation 17), while the right diagram
illustrates the money multiplication lending strategy (Equation 14).
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Figure 3: Money aggregates analysis under narrow and broad banking: all three visualizations are generated,
when the interbank coordination occurs under perfect pooling, no repayment of customer loans, and no repayment
of interbank loans. Other parameters follow the baseline scenario in Table 2. The left graph represents the
simulation result when all banks use A1 as the reserve base (i.e. narrow banking), while banks in both the middle
and right graphs use A1 + A3 as reserve base (i.e. broad banking). Moreover, banks in both the left and middle
graphs use the lending strategy of fractional reserve (Equation 17), while the right graph is based on the lending
strategy of money multiplication (Equation 14).
4 Financial stability and interbank credit coordination modes
Section 2 introduced our model of bank credit creation featured by interbank credit under the
functional equivalence between currency and deposit (broad banking). Section 3 illustrated the
working of the banking system in case of perfect and complete interbank credit pooling across
all the monetary financial institutions (banks).
Complete and perfect pooling provides a benchmark representation against which we may com-
paratively assess the impact of interbank credit coordination on financial stability and resilience.
This ideal coordination mode enables all the banks to access to all the others at each time period
(complete pooling network), with all banks being interested in either lending to, or borrowing
from each other (perfect pooling network). Therefore, the reserve base that is factually segre-
gated between banks is completely and perfectly pooled across them, in view to assure interbank
settlement and credit at each time period t.
This section 4 develops some visualizations through simulation analysis to compare results
under this ideal coordination mode with two alternative modes of incomplete and imperfect
pooling. One mode is featured by a smooth degree of inter-bank coordination (with φ = 0.4).
Another mode is featured by a distressed degree of inter-bank coordination (with φ = 0.8).
When inter-bank credit conditions worsen, it becomes increasingly difficult for potential bor-
rowing banks to find counter-parties willing to lend (captured by increasing levels of inter-bank
coordination quality parameter φ). This comparative analysis may help inferring implications
of banking system dynamic for financial stability and resilience.
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The following simulation analysis applies a baseline calibration that is common to each sce-
nario (Table 2). This calibration sets the same economic and financial conditions through all
time periods and all visualizations. Banks operate under the broad banking regime (the mone-
tary base being then defined by A1+A3) and through the money multiplication lending strategy
(Equation 14). Customer and interbank credit repayments are now activated and dynamically
offset the ongoing credit creation granted to customers and other banks. By assumption, inter-
bank credit is repaid quicker than customer credit. For the sake of simplicity, no default occurs
on either credit facility. Our simulation analysis focuses on systemic outcomes under featured
conditions of interbank coordination. In particular, we visualize results for four systemic out-
comes under three levels of interbank credit coordination quality (labeled respectively perfect,
smooth, and distressed pooling). The four systemic outcomes point to: (i) customer lending;
(ii) interbank credit (lending and borrowing); (iii) central bank recourse; and (iv) bank equity
and profit and loss at each period. The following analysis summarizes results from a series of
1000 replications run on the baseline calibration in Table 2.
For the sake of comparison with visualizations in section 3 (Figures 2 and 3), the money
aggregates dynamics under baseline calibration is reproduced in Figure 4. Individual banks
analysis (Figure 4 panel 2) shows that banks follow their own heterogeneous time patterns for
each money aggregate {L1i,t;L2i,t;L3i,t}, which sums up to generate a banking system with
moderate customer loan growth over time (Figure 4 panel 1).
Concerning customer lending (Figure 5), better interbank credit coordination (perfect and
smooth pooling scenarios) involves higher aggregate lending to customers. Moreover, some
individual banks can also maintain larger customer loan portfolios over time in this circum-
stance. This result is qualified by the quite heroic assumption that real economy customers do
keep absorbing bank loan offers over time without limit or default. It may be further tested by
sensitivity analysis over the parameter space.
Increased customer lending does further involve an increased interdependency on the flow of
payments that are performed through bank wire transfer movements across customer bank de-
posits L2i,t. Concerning interbank lending (Figure 6) and borrowing (Figure 7), individual
interbank credit behaves as expected to worsening interbank coordination quality (increasing
level of φ). Worsened conditions reduce overall interbank lending both in aggregate (Figure 6
panel 1 and 2) and at the level of individual banks (Figure 6 panel 3). Therefore, borrowing
banks are restrained in their access to interbank credit (Figure 7), both in aggregate (Figure 7
panel 1 and 2) and for individual amounts (Figure 7 panel 3).
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Although better interbank credit conditions involve larger and more intense exposure to inter-
bank borrowing (Figure 7), this does not generate increased recourse to central bank assistance
(Figure 8). Deterioration in interbank coordination (smooth and distressed pooling scenarios)
generates fragilities in individual and aggregate bank exposures. As long as interbank coordi-
nation works perfectly (perfect pooling scenario), aggregate and individual recourses to central
bank assistance are immaterial and then virtually non-existent (Figure 8, perfect pooling sce-
nario). When interbank conditions worsen, banks are increasingly forced to have recourse to
central bank overdraft facility to keep their affairs ongoing. Their recourse becomes more in-
tense in amount and more frequent in time (Figure 8 and 10), involving longer and more acute
state of distress for individual banks and then the banking system as a whole. As expected,
distressed pooling scenario makes the central bank recourse L5i,t the most frequent in time and
the most intense in both aggregate and individual amounts. Moreover, the banking system
needs assistance almost permanently under distressed pooling, while assistance requests occur
later and sporadically under smooth pooling.
Previous analysis shows that interbank credit coordination has impact on customer loan, inter-
bank borrowing and recourse to central bank assistance. Consequently, it shapes bank equity
dynamics over time and circumstances (Figure 9). Under lower interbank coordination quality
(smooth and distressed pooling scenarios), bank equity (L4i,t) remains thinner on average and
more concentrated on lower amounts (Figure 9 panel 1). Bank profits and losses (P/L) of the
period pii,t (i.e. ∆L4i,t through time periods) are also materially lower, due to reduced revenue
from customer loans and increased expense for central bank assistance. Therefore, under lower
interbank coordination quality (smooth and distressed pooling scenarios), banks are increasingly
unable to accumulate equity reserves through retained earnings, in view to protect themselves
against possible losses incurred in ongoing customer and interbank lending (Figure 9 panel 2).
In fact, this result is qualified by the quite heroic assumption that banks do not distribute
dividends to management and shareholders. It may yet hold when this distribution remains in
line with realized earnings over time and circumstances.
5 Concluding remarks
Troubles in interbank credit coordination may trigger systemic crises. This happened when,
since summer 2007, interbank credit did not longer work smoothly across financial institutions,
eventually leading to central bank interventions and government bailouts to protect financial
stability and assure financial resilience. While this crisis was accidentally triggered by rising
actual and expected defaults in some bank asset categories, the origins of the global financial
meltdown were found in systemic fragilities related to bank excess behaviours and the overar-
ching dynamics of interbank credit.
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Our article develops an interacting heterogeneous agent-based model of interbank credit coor-
dination under minimal institutions, taking a systemic perspective on the relationship between
bank credit, money creation and interbank credit. Specific attention is paid to the way banks
perform credit creation along with interbank credit, clearing, and payment settlements.
First, our analysis explores the relationship between interbank credit coordination and aggre-
gate money generation process. Contrary to received wisdom, interbank credit has the capacity
to remove the inner limits of monetary system capacitance in some configurations. Second, a
simulation analysis investigates modes of interbank credit coordination, addressing interbank
dynamics impact on financial stability and resilience at individual and aggregate levels. Sys-
temically destabilizing forces prove to be related to the working of the banking system over
time, especially interbank coordination conditions and circumstances.
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Figure 4: Money aggregate dynamics under baseline calibration (Parameter values are summarized in the
Table 2, numerical data are extracted from 1000 replications under this baseline scenario.). Three degrees of
inter-bank coordination are analyzed (i.e. perfect pooling φ = 0, smooth pooling φ = 0.4, and distressed pooling
φ = 0.8). Panel 1 shows the mean of total amounts of money aggregates under the three analyzed cases, and
Panel 2 shows an average of a single bank illustrative case.
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Figure 5: Customer lending under baseline calibration (parameter values are summarized in the Table 2, nu-
merical data are extracted from 1000 replications under this baseline scenario). Three degrees of inter-bank
coordination are analyzed (i.e. perfect pooling φ = 0, smooth pooling φ = 0.4, and distressed pooling φ = 0.8,
three columns represent different pooling conditions). Panel 1 shows the mean of total accumulated amounts of
customer loans under three analyzed cases over time, Panel 2 provides the histograms of the mean overall cus-
tomer loans in the last time period, and Panel 3 provides the histograms of mean individual banks’ customer loans
in the last time period.
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Figure 6: Interbank lending under baseline calibration (parameter values are summarized in the Table 2, nu-
merical data are extracted from 1000 replications under this baseline scenario). Three degrees of inter-bank
coordination are analyzed (i.e. perfect pooling φ = 0, smooth pooling φ = 0.4, and distressed pooling φ = 0.8,
three columns represent different pooling conditions). Panel 1 shows the mean total accumulated amounts of in-
terbank lending in the system of three analyzed cases over time, Panel 2 provides the histograms of the last time
period mean overall interbank lending, and Panel 3 provides the histograms of mean individual banks’ interbank
lending in the last time period.
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Figure 7: Interbank borrowing under baseline calibration (parameter values are summarized in the Table 2,
numerical data are extracted from 1000 replications under this baseline scenario). Three degrees of inter-bank
coordination are analyzed (i.e. perfect pooling φ = 0, smooth pooling φ = 0.4, and distressed pooling φ = 0.8,
three columns represent different pooling conditions). Panel 1 shows the mean total accumulated amounts of
interbank borrowing in the system of three analyzed cases over time, Panel 2 provides the histograms of the last
time period mean overall interbank borrowing, and Panel 3 provides the histograms of mean individual banks’
interbank borrowing in the last time period.
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Figure 8: Central bank assistance L5 (see Equation 31) under baseline calibration (parameter values are sum-
marized in the Table 2, numerical data are extracted from 1000 replications under this baseline scenario). Three
degrees of inter-bank coordination are analyzed (i.e. perfect pooling φ = 0, smooth pooling φ = 0.4, and distressed
pooling φ = 0.8, three columns represent different pooling conditions). Panel 1 shows the mean amounts of central
bank assistance change ∆L5 in the system of three analyzed cases over time, Panel 2 provides the histograms of
mean overall central bank assistance (
∑
i L5i) in the last time period, and Panel 3 provides the histograms of
mean individual central bank assistance (L5i) in the last time period.
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Figure 9: Bank equity dynamics over time and circumstances under baseline calibration (parameter values are
summarized in the Table 2, numerical data are extracted from 1000 replications under this baseline scenario).
Three degrees of inter-bank coordination are analyzed (i.e. perfect pooling φ = 0, smooth pooling φ = 0.4, and
distressed pooling φ = 0.8, three columns represent different pooling conditions). Panel 1 shows the histograms of
mean bank equity (L4i,t) over time in the system of three analyzed cases (Equation 32), and Panel 2 provides the
histograms of mean individual banks’ profit or loss (pii,t) in each time period (Equation 33).
Figure 10: Box-plot of the first time occurrence Ti for central bank guarantee intervention L5i under the various
pooling conditions (Panel 1) and the amount (L5i, T ) of these first time occurrences (Panel 2). Numerical data
are extracted from 1000 replications under the baseline scenario (Table 2).
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